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ABSTRACT
As technology continues to evolve, interactions between humans
and artificial intelligence (“AI”) will skyrocket. It is important to
understand the impact AI can have on society, as well as the
potential harm and subsequent liability that could result, and to
develop best practices designed to address them. The U.S. needs a
comprehensive framework to govern the design, creation, use and
risks associated with AI. At the time of this writing, no such
framework has been implemented.
This article takes a socio-legal, interdisciplinary approach to
explore ideas on socio-ethical concerns and theories of liability
related to AI, and applies a sociological perspective to assess
existing legal frameworks that currently govern human-AI
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interaction. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this article
seeks to encourage holistic and robust dialogue about how AI could
be developed and operated, hoping that humans and AI can coexist
harmoniously. It also proposes a framework to regulate such
development in the U.S.
There are a few limitations in this article. First, due to the
accelerated pace of technological change, the future state of AI will
be different from the current state. Hence, the framework proposed
in this article might eventually become obsolete. Second, this article
is derived from secondary sources and, although the information
collected includes rich empirical data, no primary data was
generated other than the authors’ views. Third, only specific aspects
of AI were selected for analysis – there are other factors in policy,
sociology and law that are not addressed. Lastly, this article is
primarily focused on Western cultures, North America and Europe
in particular; hence, it might not be applicable globally.
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INTRODUCTION
Some believe that, in ten to twenty years, human intelligence and
artificial intelligence will be equal. 1 According to futurist Ray
Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns, by the year 2045,
superintelligence, capable of self-improvement, will cause an
intelligence explosion or “technological singularity” superior to
human intelligence. Under this theory, AI will be autonomous and
able to act independent from the will of humanity.2
As Germany’s Ethics Commission for Automated and
Connected Driving (2016) stated, a primary question to ask as we
move into the future of AI is: “[w]hat technological development
guidelines are required to ensure that we do not blur the contours of
a human society that places individuals, their freedom of
development, their physical and intellectual integrity and their
entitlement to social respect at the heart of its legal regime?”3 This
question requires holistic assessment from both a sociological and
legal perspective. Accordingly, this article explores the relationship
between human beings and AI, and the laws that govern their
interactions. This article first examines how humans interact with
1

See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN
COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 40-47 (1999).
2
Paulius Čerka et al., Liability for Damages Caused by Artificial
Intelligence, 31 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 376, 382 (2015) (citing Ray
Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns (Mar. 7, 2001),
http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns).
3
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE,
ETHICS COMMISSION: AUTOMATED AND CONNECTED DRIVING (2017).
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AI, and in particular, with Socially Assistive Robotics. Next, this
article examines ethical and moral concerns surrounding human-AI
interactions. Third, this article seeks to understand whether a
sufficient legal and regulatory environment capable of governing
human-AI interaction exists. Finally, this article proposes a moral
and legal framework to guide AI development.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Definitions of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
The definition of AI is a work in progress as there is no
universally accepted definition. 4 For example, MIT Professor
Patrick Winston defined AI as “the study of computations that make
it possible to perceive, reason and act.”5 In a later lecture, Winston
further described AI as “algorithms or procedures enabled by
constraints exposed by representations modeled and targeted at
thinking, perception and action.”6 Technology analysts for Deloitte
Consulting define AI as “the theory and development of computer
systems able to perform tasks that normally require human
intelligence.”7 Under all three definitions, AI is targeted at helping
machines to think and act like humans.
“Machine learning,” a related piece of the AI puzzle, was coined
by Arthur Samuel in 1959 as “a field of study that gives computers
the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed.” 8 Tom
4

See Jeff Leek, What is artificial intelligence? A three part definition,
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://simplystatistics.org/2017/01/19/what-isartificial-intelligence/.
5
PATRICK WINSTON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 5 (3d ed.1992).
6
Patrick Winston, Lecture 1: Introduction and Scope, MIT
OPENCOURSEWARE,
https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-engineering-andcomputer-science/6-034-artificial-intelligence-fall-2010/lecture-videos/lecture1-introduction-and-scope/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2017).
7
DAVID SCHATSKY ET AL. Cognitive Technologies: The Real Opportunities
for Business, DELOITTE REVIEW ISSUE 16 (Jan. 26, 2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/deloitte-review/issue-16/cognitivetechnologies-business-applications.html.
8
MARIETTE AWAD & RAHUL KHANNA, EFFICIENT LEARNING MACHINES
SIMPLYSTATS

2018]

BLAME IT ON THE MACHINE

53

Mitchell later proposed a more precise definition in 1998 as “a
computer program that is said to learn from experience ‘E’ with
respect to some class of tasks ‘T’ and performance measure ‘P’, if
its performance at tasks in ‘T’, as measured by ‘P’, improves with
experience ‘E’.”9 Machine learning is then an application of AI that
focuses on the ability of machines to self-learn and improve either
from direct experience or instruction. Its goal is to allow machines
to learn without human intervention and ultimately enable
autonomy. 10
This article refers to all AI enhanced robots, AI programs, and
machine learning supported technology as “machines” or “AI”
interchangeably. It analyzes human-machine interaction through a
sociological lens because sociology is “the study of the
development, structure, and functioning of human society.”11 From
that perspective, we define machines and AI as embodied and
disembodied autonomous actors able to perform human actions that
normally require human intelligence, learn without human
intervention and interact directly with humans in natural
environments.
It is worth noting that the meaning of “AI” evolves over time
because AI is constantly changing. 12 Once something is done, it
becomes commonplace and is no longer referred to as AI. Carlos
Guestrin, an expert in machine learning, stated in an interview
regarding this so-called AI effect: “It's a perceptual thing—once
something becomes commonplace, it's demystified, and it doesn't

THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND APPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERS AND SYSTEM
DESIGNERS (2015), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5990-9_1.
9
TOM MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 2, (1997).
10
Rob Schapire, COS 511: Theoretical Machine Learning Lecture #1,
PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY
(Feb.
4,
2008),
https://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spr08/cos511/scribe_notes/0204.p
df.
11
Sociology,
OXFORD
DICTIONARY,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sociology (last visited Dec. 15,
2018).
12
PAMELA MCCORDUCK, MACHINES WHO THINK: A PERSONAL INQUIRY
INTO THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE xiii (2d ed.
2004).
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feel like the magical intelligence that we see in humans.”13
B. What is the State of Machines Today?
Machines have been around since the 1950s, so what makes this
topic so important today? There are six key factors driving change:
1. Computing Power and Moore’s Law
Coined by Intel-cofounder Gordon Moore in 1965, Moore’s
Law stands for the premise that computing power will double every
year.14 Empirical observations tend to support Moore’s Law—new
machines are significantly more powerful and less costly than their
predecessors. 15 In fact, the world’s fastest supercomputer has
already surpassed human memory capacity and processing power
for certain kinds of information 16 and the current generation of
computer microprocessors (the mechanisms that determine
computing power) provide four million times the performance of the
first microprocessors made in 1971.17
2. Big Data and Big Knowledge
Machines depend on data analysis to determine how to
13

Guia Marie Del Prado, This Phenomenon Explains What Everyone Gets
Wrong
About
AI,
(Oct.
22,
2015),
https://www.businessinsider.com/misconception-artificial-intelligene-2015-10.
14
Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,
86
PROCEEDINGS
OF
THE
IEEE
82–85
(1998),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/658762.
15
Mark J. Perry, Technology has advanced so rapidly that a laptop computer
today is 96% cheaper than a 1994 model and 1,000X better, AEIDEAS (May 25,
2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/technology-has-advanced-so-rapidly-thata-laptop-computer-today-is-96-cheaper-than-a-1994-model-and-1000x-better/;
see also Tim Cross, Vanishing point: the rise of the invisible computer, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
26,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/jan/26/vanishing-point-rise-invisible-computer.
16
Marki Fischetti, Computers versus Brains, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 1,
2011) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/computers-vs-brains/.
17
After Moore’s Law, THE ECONOMIST: TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY (Mar. 12,
2016),
https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2016-03-12/aftermoores-law.
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“think” and what corresponding actions to take. 18 Due to social
media, the internet and smart phones, the amount of data available
for analysis continues to grow exponentially. For example, ninety
percent of the data in the world today was created in the last two
years and the current global output of data is roughly 2.5 quintillion
bytes per day.19 As the world steadily becomes more connected with
an ever-increasing number of electronic devices, the amount of data
generated will continue to grow. In addition to data, as of 2013, the
level of human knowledge was doubling every 13 months and will
eventually double every 12 hours.20
3. The Internet and the Cloud
The internet and cloud computing make vast amounts of data
and information immediately available to average users. 21 The
global internet population has grown by more than 60% since 2010,
and as of 2014, there were more mobile devices on the planet than
people. 22 Mobile devices alone generate more than 18 million
megabytes of data every minute in the U.S.23

18

See Peter Stone et al., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030, STANFORD
UNIVERSITY,
8-17
(Sept.
2016),
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf
(stating that advances in large scale information gathering and processing have
fueled the AI revolution).
19
Tom Hale, How Much Data Does the World Generate Every Minute?, IFL
SCIENCE! (July 26, 2017), http://www.iflscience.com/technology/how-muchdata-does-the-world-generate-every-minute/.
20
David R. Schilling, Knowledge Doubling Every 12 Months, Soon to be
Every
12
Hours,
INDUSTRY
TAP
(Apr.
19,
2013)
http://www.industrytap.com/knowledge-doubling-every-12-months-soon-to-beevery-12-hours/3950 (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
21
Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation Of 'The Internet Of Things', FORBES
(May 13, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simpleexplanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#6c221251d091.
22
Eric Mack, There Are Now More Gadgets on Earth Than People, CNET
(Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.cnet.com/news/there-are-now-more-gadgets-onearth-than-people/.
23
See Josh James, Data Never Sleeps 4.0, DOMO (Jun. 28, 2016),
https://www.domo.com/blog/data-never-sleeps-4-0/.
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4. New Algorithms
This level of connectedness allows humans to collaborate
and develop AI in ways not previously available.24 All of the above
factors have contributed to the development of new algorithms, such
as those leveraged in OpenAI’s Hindsight Experience Replay,
which allows machines to mimic the way that humans learn when
trying to master a new skill.25
5. Technology Companies with Big Capital
According to Farhad Manjoo, the big five technology giants
(Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft) are the most
influential leaders in AI development. 26 They also happen to
represent some of the most well-capitalized companies in history.
Apple and Amazon both reached one trillion dollar valuations in
2018,27 making them the largest companies on earth by market value
with a combined value greater than the United Kingdom’s gross
domestic product. 28 Manjoo recently stated that the big five
technology giants have “become more like governments than
companies with the amount of money they have [and] the kind of

The 3 Forces that Brought AI to Life (And Why it’s Only Now Changing
the
World),
THE
CLOUDFACTORY
BLOG
(Dec.
15,
2017),
https://blog.cloudfactory.com/3-forces-brought-ai-to-life.
25
Marcin Andrychowicz et al., Hindsight Experience Replay, ADVANCES IN
NEURAL
INFORMATION
PROCESSING
SYSTEMS
30
(2017),
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/7090-hindsight-experience-replay.
26
How 5 Tech Giants Have Become More Like Governments Than
Companies,
NPR
(Oct.
26,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/26/560136311/how-5-tech-giants-have-becomemore-like-governments-than-companies.
27
David Streitfeld, Amazon Hits $1,000,000,000,000 in Value, Following
Apple,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
4,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/technology/amazon-stock-price-1-trillionvalue.html.
28
Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Alphabet, and Microsoft Are Collectively
Worth More Than the Entire Economy of the United Kingdom, INC.COM, (Apr.
27,
2018),
https://www.inc.com/associated-press/mindblowing-facts-techindustry-money-amazon-apple-microsoft-facebook-alphabet.html.
24
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power they have over democracy in society.”29 These companies are
joining forces to accelerate the pace of AI development.30
6. Government-backed AI Development
The Chinese government announced its intention to become
a principal player in AI innovation by the year 2030, but it is not the
only player in town.31 Although private companies are the primary
drivers for AI innovation in the U.S., the U.S. Department of
Defense activated the Artificial Intelligence Exploration program,
which is designed to ensure that the U.S. maintains an advantage in
AI development. 32 Japan’s government released its Artificial
Intelligence Technology Strategy in 2017, focusing on AI utilization
and application, public use and connectivity. 33 South Korea, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Denmark, Sweden,
Estonia, Finland, Poland, Singapore, Malaysia Australia, India,
Italy, Canada, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates are all
investing in AI development.34
II. AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: HUMANS AND MACHINES
Over time, the six factors described above will enable machines
to act more like humans and better engage in traditional humanhuman interaction. This will increase human-AI interconnectivity
resulting in some of the positive sociological impacts and potential
29

NPR, supra note 26.
Romain Dillet, Apple joins Amazon, Facebook, Google, IBM and Microsoft
in
AI
Initiative,
TECH
CRUNCH
(Jan.
27,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/27/apple-joins-amazon-facebook-google-ibmand-microsoft-in-ai-initiative/.
31
Associated Press, China Announces Goal of Leadership in Artificial
Intelligence
by
2030,
CBS
NEWS
(July
21,
2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-announces-goal-of-leadership-inartificial-intelligence-by-2030/.
32
Accelerating the Exploration of Promising Artificial Intelligence Concepts,
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (July 20, 2018),
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-07-20a.
33
Kathleen Walch, The Race for AI Dominance is More Global Than You
Think, MEDIUM (Aug. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/cognilytica/the-race-for-aidominance-is-more-global-than-you-think-e01a0c34d64e.
34
Id.
30
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threats described next. By way of example, we will assess the
impacts and threats associated with Socially Assistive Robots
(“SARs”).
A. Positive Social Impacts
SARs are an example of current human-AI interconnectivity.
SARs provide technical, emotional and communal support to human
users through social interaction. 35 SARs aim to provide direct
assistance to people in generalized settings like homes, schools and
hospitals. 36 According to The Social Robotics Lab at Yale
University, SARs can learn, recognize and respond to human social
cues. In doing so, SARs can enhance social, emotional, and
cognitive growth in humans, specifically children with social and
cognitive disabilities.37
The utility of SARs can be assessed through two of the three
major schools of sociological thought: Functionalist Theory and
Conflict Theory. Functionalist Theory defines society as a system
of interrelated and interdependent parts working together to
maintain order and stability.38 Conflict Theory defines society as a
place of inequality that generates conflict and social change.39
From the Functionalist perspective, SARs have at least three
positive functions. First, SARs establish effective interaction with
human users with an aim to assist and achieve measurable outcomes
in therapy, rehabilitation and education. For example, SARs support
the learning process of children with learning disabilities. 40
Preliminary studies suggest that robots may act as gratifying social

35

David Feil-Seifer & Maja Mataric, Defining Socially Assistive Robotics,
9TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REHABILITATION ROBOTICS, 465–68
(2005).
36
Id.
37
“Socially Assistive Robots”: An NSF Expedition in Computing, YALE
UNIVERSITY, http://robotshelpingkids.yale.edu/overview (last visited Jan. 19,
2018).
38
JOAN FERRANTE, SOCIOLOGY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 26-27 (9th ed.
2015).
39
Id. at 30.
40
YALE UNIVERSITY, supra note 37.
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partners for children with autism spectrum disorders. 41 Second,
SARs reduce caregiver burnout by providing assistive care to the
physically disabled, convalescent patients and the elderly.42 Third,
combat SARs are used on battlefields to reduce human combat error
and human casualties.43
At the time of this writing, SARs are already quite advance.
Sophia is the latest and most prominent SAR. Activated in 2015,
Sophia is a social-humanoid machine developed by Hong Kongbased company Hanson Robotics.44 Sophia can walk, talk and make
sixty-two different facial expressions.45 She has appeared in various
forms of media, engaged in high-profile interviews and participated
in trade shows around the world.46 Despite Sophia’s popularity, not
everyone is a fan. For example, Facebook’s director of AI research,
Yan LeCun, tweeted: “[Sophia] is to AI as prestidigitation is to real
magic. Perhaps we should call this ‘Cargo Cult AI’ or ‘Potemkin
AI’ or ‘Wizard-of-Oz AI.’” 47 LeCun did not elaborate but his
criticism suggests that Sophia is just another robot with no
comprehension of what it is doing.
B. Potential Threats

41

David Feil-Seifer, Towards Spatial Methods for Socially Assistive
Robotics: Validation with Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders, TWENTYSECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(2011).
42
FEIL-SEIFER & MATARIC, supra note 35.
43
Peter Ray Allison., What Does a Bomb Disposal Robot Actually Do?, BBC
NEWS (July 15, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160714-what-does-abomb-disposal-robot-actually-do.
44
Hi, I am Sophia…, HANSON ROBOTICS (last visited Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.hansonrobotics.com/sophia/.
45
Harriet Taylor, Could You Fall in Love with This Robot?, CNBC (Mar. 16,
2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/16/could-you-fall-in-love-with-thisrobot.html.
46
CNBC, Interview with The Lifelike Hot Robot Named Sophia (Full),
YOUTUBE, (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5t6K9iwcdw.
47
Shona Ghosh, Facebook's AI boss described Sophia the robot as 'complete
b------t' and 'Wizard-of-Oz AI’, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Jan. 6, 2018),
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-ai-yann-lecun-sophia-robot-bullshit2018-1.
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1. Human-Machine Digital Divide
The Conflict perspective predicts that the introduction of SARs
will usher in a new digital divide (i.e., human-machine divide),
separating the haves from the have-nots. Accordingly, the gap will
increase between the advantaged population with the capital to
acquire SARs and the disadvantaged population with limited
financial resources.48 For example, although robot-assisted surgery
is becoming more common, it is still fairly expensive and not
everyone can afford it.49 This divide is predicted to occur on a global
scale, dividing the richest countries from the poorest countries,
further broadening the inequality gap.50
The Conflict perspective also views any apparent altruistic
motives, such as developing SARs to assist children with autism, as
a façade to cover up profit-driven motives.51 Conflict theorists argue
that companies are driven by a desire to maximize profits by
reducing manpower and its associated costs, leading to increased
unemployment.
2. Human-Machine Intimacy and Social Isolation
Frequent and intimate interactions between humans and
machines may result in social isolation. Companies like Realbotix
have created silicone sex machines that bring recent Hollywood
movies like “Her” and “Ex Machina” to life.52 Realbotix produces
both male and female robots, which come with dozens of
interchangeable parts, allowing users to alter everything from eye
and hair color to the size and shape of robots’ sexual organs.53 While
48

JOAN FERRANTE, SEEING SOCIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 28 (3d ed. 2016).
Gina Kolata, Results Unproven, Robotic Surgery Wins Converts, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
13,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/health/14robot.html.
50
FERRANTE, supra note 48, at 28.
51
FERRANTE, supra note 38, at 30.
52
HER (ANNAPURNA PICTURES 2013); EX MACHINA (FILM4, DNA FILMS
2014).
53
Jon Rogers, Meet ‘Robohunk’ – The £11k 6ft hunky sex doll with rippling
muscles and a British accent, THE SUN (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5666789/sex-doll-robohunk-rippling-muscles49

2018]

BLAME IT ON THE MACHINE

61

some support this trend, arguing that sex machines will provide
companionship, and minimize crime rates and human-human
infidelity, critics point out that use of sex machines raises social and
ethical issues like obsession and overdependence.54
3. Machine Social Bias and Hacking
A recent study, wherein Boston University and Microsoft
Research New England used word embeddings to train a machine to
handle language, revealed that machines can learn gender bias. 55
Word embeddings result from letting AI draw connections between
words found in phrases from huge data sets, like Word2Vec, an
aggregated data set compiled from Google News. 56 Developers
typically use word embeddings to train “chatbots, translation
systems, image-captioning programs, and recommendation
algorithms.” 57 This process allows machines to make semantic
connections between words like “king” and “queen” and understand
that their relationship is similar to the relationship between the
words “man” and “woman.” In the above study, this seemingly
benign training resulted in something disturbing—the machine
ultimately concluded that the word “programmer” was closer to the
word “man” than “woman,” and that the most similar word for
“woman” was “homemaker.”58
According to a joint research project by Google, OpenAI,
Stanford University and UC Berkeley, this type of gender bias is not
the only risk in machine development. 59 Additional problems
british-accent-11k/.
54
FRR Report: Our Sexual Future with Robots, RESPONSIBLE ROBOTICS.
(July 5, 2017), https://responsiblerobotics.org/2017/07/05/frr-report-our-sexualfuture-with-robots/.
55
Will Knight, How to Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms, MIT
TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW
(Nov.
23,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexistalgorithms/.
56
Rich Barlow, Is Your Computer Sexist?, BU TODAY (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://www.bu.edu/today/2016/sexist-computer/.
57
Id.
58
Knight, supra note 55.
59
Dario Amodei et al., Concrete Problems in AI Safety, CORNELL U. LIBR.,
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include negative side effects, 60 reward hacking 61 and scalable
oversight. 62 As a result, Dario Amodei suggests developing a
principled, forward-looking and universal approach to AI
development “that continues to remain relevant as autonomous
systems become more powerful.”63
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY TO ADDRESS HARM INVOLVING AI
As theories of legal liability reflect a civilization’s social goals,
this article next considers theories of liability available to address
risk and harm resulting from human-AI interaction. The following
explores statutory and common law theories of liability for harm that
results from human-machine interaction.
A. Statutes and Regulations
At the time of this writing, no comprehensive statutory scheme
exists in the U.S. to address human-machine risk and liability.
However, Congress has introduced several related bills that seem to
move in that direction.64 For example, in December 2017, the House
of Representatives introduced the Fundamentally Understanding the
Usability and Realistic Evolution of Artificial Intelligence Act of
https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06565 (last revised July 25, 2016).
60
Negative side effects occur when the designer creates an objective function
for the machine that focuses on achieving a specific objective in its target
environment but ignores other aspects of the environment–implicitly expressing
indifference to other environmental variables and the objective functions’ impact
on them, ultimately resulting in harm.
61
Reward hacking occurs when the objective function allows for some
clever, easy solution that maximizes the machine’s ability to achieve the objective
function but perverts the spirit of the designer's intent (i.e., the objective function
can be gamed).
62
Scalable oversight means that it is too expensive to implement and monitor
detailed and frequent controls in the development process, which leads to bad
machine interpretation of limited training data samples.
63
Amodei, supra note 59, at 21.
64
Christopher Fonzone, What Congress’s First Steps into AI Legislation
Portend,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(May
15,
2018),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/what-congresss-firststeps-into-ai-legislation-portend/.
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2017 (“FUTURE of AI Act”),65 which requires the Department of
Commerce to establish the Federal Advisory Committee on the
Development and Implementation of Artificial Intelligence.66 The
Committee would consider, among other things: a) accountability
and legal rights associated with AI; b) AI’s impact on the U.S.
workforce; c) whether and how to incorporate ethical standards into
AI development; d) machine learning bias injected through cultural
and societal norms; and e) U.S. competitiveness in the global AI
market.67 In January 2018, Congress also introduced the A.I. JOBS
Act of 2018, which would require the U.S. Secretary of Labor to
develop an industry report outlining the impact that AI will have on
the U.S. workforce.68
In light of advanced cybersecurity technology and associated
risk, the federal government has also taken a stronger stance on
holding manufacturers accountable for failing to reasonably secure
their products.69 Most recently, the Federal Trade Commission filed
a complaint against D-Link Corporation for allegedly preventable
vulnerabilities in its routers and internet cameras.70
Several U.S. states have taken steps to legislate use of
autonomous vehicles, despite cautions that states should avoid
developing independent regimes to avoid a patchwork of laws.71 For
65

The FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017 was introduced jointly
as S. 2217 and H.R. 4625 on December 12, 2017 and referred to the Committees
on Energy and Commerce, Science, Space, and Technology, Education and the
Workforce, Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, and Oversight and Government
Reform. On December 15, 2017, it was referred to the Subcommittee on Digital
Commerce and Consumer Protection.
66
See FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act, S. 2217, 115th Cong. (20172018); FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act, H.R. 4625, 115th Cong. (20172018).
67
Id.
68
See AI JOBS Act of 2018, H.R. 4829, 115th Cong. (2018).
69
See Enforcing Privacy Promises, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumerprivacy/enforcing-privacy-promises (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
70
FTC Charges D-Link Put Consumers’ Privacy at Risk Due to the
Inadequate Security of Its Computer Routers and Cameras, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
(Jan.
5,
2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2017/01/ftc-charges-d-link-put-consumers-privacy-risk-due-inadequate.
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example, in anticipation of autonomous rideshare fleets by
companies like Uber and Lyft, Michigan’s autonomous vehicle
(“AV”) law specifically regulates AV ride-share networks. 72
Anticipating the impact that technology companies will have on the
AV industry, Michigan fashioned the statute’s liability rules to: 1)
qualify machines as “drivers” for purposes of assigning
responsibility for accidents, 2) define liability for technology
companies that supply AV software, and 3) insulate car
manufacturers from liability except where the damage was caused
by a defect that existed when the vehicle was originally
manufactured and before its conversion to AV. 73 The statute is
instructive as to how future legislation may allocate risk for
accidents involving machines.
Overall, AV regulation seems to be the most developed example
of AI regulation in the U.S. This is probably the case because the
AV market represents a perfect storm of viable technology, market
readiness, risk to human life and potential sweeping change to the
way humans travel. The implication for other AI regulation is that
market readiness and commercial opportunity will drive AI
legislation.74
If that pattern of market-driven regulation persists, common law
will be the primary mechanism for addressing human-machine
liability – at least until legislators react to the market. Following that
comprehensive self-driving regulations, RECODE (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.recode.net/2016/12/9/13890080/michigan-dot-self-driving-carslaws-automakers.
72
See Ryan Felton, GM Aims To Get Ahead Of Everyone With Autonomous
Ride-Sharing Service In Multiple Cities By 2019, JALOPNIK (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://jalopnik.com/gm-aims-to-get-ahead-of-everyone-with-autonomous-rides-1820886131; see also Mike Isaac, Lyft and Waymo Reach Deal to Collaborate
on Self-Driving Cars, NY TIMES (May 14, 2017); see also Chloe Aiello, Toyota
shows off its futuristic self-driving store, the 'e-Palette,' at CES, CNBC (Jan. 8,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/08/toyota-unveils-e-palette-at-ces.html.
73
S. FISCAL AGENCY, S.B. 996-F, (Mich. 2016).
74
Of note is the existence of international standards that could be used to
guide liability like ISO 10218-1:2011 (Robots and robotic devices -- Safety
requirements for industrial robots -- Part 1: Robots) and Article 12 of the United
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International
Contracts (stating that a person “on whose behalf a computer was programmed
should ultimately be responsible for any message generated by the machine.”).
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logic, the next section describes certain theories of common law
liability and their limitations.
B. Common Law
Physical harm caused by machines is not a novel issue for courts
to address. The Therac-25 case involved at least six accidents
between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given massive
overdoses of radiation resulting in two deaths and four serious
injuries.75 Issues arose due to scalable oversight, lack of proper bug
fixing and replacing humans with machine automation for safetycritical systems function.76
However, courts have also absolved companies from liability for
harm that their technology caused. For example, in 1986, a federal
court held that Apple could not be sued for bugs in its software,
having disclaimed liability after making no claim that its code was
bug-free. 77 Since that time, many courts have held similarly,
including in a large consumer class action case in California against
Microsoft for software riddled with flaws and bugs.78
Accordingly, in the current U.S. legal environment, parties
seeking recovery for harm suffered at the hands of machines face
several limitations in theories of contract and tort liability.
1. Limitations on Contract Liability
On its face, the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) provides
great protection for parties that suffer harm from a purchased
product. Sellers create express warranties or promises when they
affirm facts or make promises about a product, provide a description
of what the product is or can do, or provide a sample or model which
75

NANCY LEVESON, SAFEWARE: SYSTEM SAFETY AND COMPUTERS,
APPENDIX A 9-44 (1995).
76
Id. at 44-49.
77
Paul Rosenzweig, Bad Code Is Already a Problem. Soon, Companies Will
Be
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(July
28,
2017),
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relates to the product that becomes part of the basis for the bargain.79
In addition to express warranties, sellers can make and be bound by
implied warranties like the warranty that products conform to an
ordinary buyer’s expectations for products of that kind (i.e., the
implied warranty of merchantability), 80 and the warranty that
products are fit for the specific purpose for which they were sold
(i.e., the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).”81
If a product fails to satisfy a seller’s express or implied
warranties, buyers injured by that failure may sue for damages.
Damages include rights to recover for both direct and indirect harm.
For example, U.C.C. § 2-715 allows plaintiffs to recover costs
reasonably incurred as a direct result of the breach. 82 The same
section extends to consequential damages, which cover injury to
person or property proximately or indirectly resulting from any
breach of warranty.83
Unfortunately, the likelihood of an injured party recovering
significant damages for breach of warranty is quite low because
sophisticated companies typically limit their risk exposure by using
warranty disclaimers and limitations on liability. 84 These warranty
disclaimers and limited liability provisions are valid so long as
certain conditions are met.85 For example, Apple’s iPhone consumer
warranty limits an injured party’s recovery period to one year from
the date of purchase; disclaims all warranties, either express or
79

See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
See U.C.C. § 2-313 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
81
See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
82
U.C.C. § 2-715 (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (incidental damages include
“expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and
custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other
reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.”).
83
Id.
84
See, e.g., Samsung Exploding Phone Lawsuits may be Derailed by Fine
Print, CBS NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/samsunggalaxy-note-7-fine-print-class-action-waiver-lawsuits/, (providing links to terms
and conditions for over thirty major technology brands).
85
U.C.C. § 2-316 requires that implied warranty disclaimers, if in writing,
be conspicuous and, as to the merchantability disclaimer, mention the term
“merchantability”. U.C.C. § 2-719 allows sellers to limit buyer’s remedies for
breach of warranty to repair and replacement, excluding all other remedies.
80
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implied, except for its One-Year Warranty; and limits recovery
under its One-Year Warranty to product repair, replacement,
exchange or refund.86 In Davidson v. Apple, Inc., Case No. 16-CV4942-LHK, 2017 WL 3149305, 19-26 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017), the
U.S. District Court for Northern California held that Apple’s limited
recovery period, disclaimers and limited remedy were all
enforceable.
Courts typically enforce such provisions. For example, in Puget
Sound Financial, L.L.C. v. Unisearch, Inc., 146 Wash. 2d 428, 47
P.3d 940 (2002) the Washington Supreme Court found a limitation
of liability clause between two parties valid and opined that such
clauses should generally be held valid unless they can be proven
unconscionable.87
Thus, despite the UCC’s protective potential, AI developers will
render it virtually meaningless through disclaimers and limitations
of liability.
2. Limitations on Tort Liability
To the extent not prohibited by the Economic Loss Rule88, an
86

Your Hardware Warranty: March 28, 2013—Present, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/legal/warranty/products/ipad-english.html (last visited
Dec. 16, 2018).
87
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
15:45 (2017); Unconscionability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see
also EV. ODE ASH. NN.§ .2-719 (“[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of goods purchased primarily for personal, family or
household use or of any services related thereto is invalid unless it is proved that
the limitation is not unconscionable”);United Van Lines v. Hertz Penske Truck
Leasing, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (describing factors weighing
into a determination of unconscionability to include whether each party has a
reasonable opportunity to understand the contract terms, whether the contract
terms were conspicuous, the prior course of dealings between the parties, and the
usage of trade).
88
Under the Economic Loss Rule, an injured party may only use tort law to
recover for personal injury or injury to property other than the goods sold under
the agreement that led to the alleged harm. The injured party is prohibited from
recovering in tort the loss in value to the good sold or other purely economic
damages associated with the sale. See WILLIAM HAWKLAND, ET AL, 1 HAWKLAND
UCC SERIES § 2-314:6 (2018).
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injured party might bring a claim in tort rather than contract. Public
policy behind tort law shifts liability from injured victims to
tortfeasors with the idea that “a motivated rational tortfeasor will
reduce potentially harmful activity to the extent that the cost of
accidents exceeds the benefits of the activity.” 89 Two tort claims
relevant to an AI world are negligent design and strict liability.
Negligent design focuses on whether the designer failed to exercise
due care in its design.90 The analysis applies a reasonable person
standard to determine whether the designer acted reasonably in
designing a product.91 If a designer acts unreasonably, a court will
find it negligent. Conversely, strict product liability ignores whether
the designer acted reasonably and instead focuses on whether the
product, when it reached consumers, was unreasonably dangerous.92
To assert a claim under this theory, consumers bear the burden to
show that: 1) the product underwent no substantial change from its
manufacture to the time of injury; 2) the consumer used the product
in a reasonable way; 3) the product caused the consumer’s injury;
and 4) the product was sold in a defective or unreasonably dangerous
condition. 93 Strict liability forces manufacturers to ensure that
products are safe before making them available to the general
public.
Following industry customs when designing or making products
forms strong defenses to negligent design and strict liability. 94 As
89

Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort
Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018).
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Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 285 (2008).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); DAVID
G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1, 23 (3d ed. 2014).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
94
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 90, at 290-300; see FED. R. EVID. 406
(customs and routine practices admissible as evidence to prove action in
conformity); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 12 (2000)
(describing tort liability as premised on deviation from acceptable standards); see
also the Frye doctrine and Daubert test which both support the custom
compliance defense because expert testimony is only admissible when it “has
gained standing and scientific recognition in the relevant community of experts.”
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (stating that “[w]idespread
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such, technology industry custom will likely insulate AI developers
and designers from risk exposure for careless design as current
industry practice is to “ship now and patch [or repair] later” to gain
user feedback and speed to market. 95 As Facebook stated in
response to a 2013 security bug, “[e]ven with a strong team, no
company can ensure 100% prevention of bugs, and in rare cases we
don’t discover a problem until it has already affected a person’s
account.”96 There is evidence that this practice will increase risk to
humans in human-AI interaction. For example, Amodei identified
frequent accidents with machine programming and learning
processes “where a human designer had in mind a certain (perhaps
informally specified) objective or task, but the system that was
designed and deployed for that task produced harmful and
unexpected results.” 97 Amodei also states that “there are many
concrete open technical problems relating to accident prevention in
machine learning systems” and that these problems will become
more prevalent as more autonomous machines are introduced to
uncontrolled environments.98 Given the above, humanity requires a
better framework than industry custom to adequately address the
risk that these accidents present.
IV. A MORAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE COMPREHENSIVE
REGULATION
A. U.S. Regulation
Comprehensive AI regulation will require a balance between
commercial, legal and societal concerns. As shown above, U.S.
common law may not adequately mitigate risks associated with AI
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence [of a scientific
method] admissible.”).
95
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development. On the other hand, over-regulation will impede AI
innovation. For example, W. Kip Viscusi found that when expected
product liability payouts are high, firms pull back on
commercializing innovation, 99 but found no negative correlation
between low to moderate liability payouts and innovation.100 Still,
some companies opt out of innovation altogether to avoid increased
liability exposure.101
Proponents of stricter liability argue that technology companies
should be held to higher liability standards because they are in the
best position to prevent defects through quality assurance and safety
protocols.102 Holding companies liable also allows them to spread
the risk through insurance or by increasing costs to consumers.103
These proponents further argue that strict liability discourages
companies from making defective products and assures
compensation to injured parties because negligence is too difficult
to prove. 104 Considering the level of economic power and
commercial sophistication of the most advanced technology
companies, these arguments have merit.
As an early overview of the RoboLaw Project put it, “[o]verly
rigid regulations might stifle innovation, but a lack of legal clarity
leaves device-makers, doctors, patients and insurers in the dark.”105
99
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Further, from a legal standpoint, centralized governance seems
to be the most efficient approach. A state-by-state attempt to
regulate machine development will likely create the same level of
administrative burden and inconsistency that patchwork
cybersecurity regulations have created in the U.S.106
Still further, risks such as the digital divide, social isolation and
social bias cited above, present a real danger of social inequity and
harm resulting from human-machine interaction.
B. European Regulation
The way forward for U.S. law remains unclear, but Germany’s
approach to regulating machine development is instructive. When
Germany became the first country to pass comprehensive AV
legislation in 2017, it also codified ethical imperatives that must be
embedded in AV design. 107 Those imperatives included
requirements that AVs cause fewer accidents than human drivers,
AV must be designed to make choices that cause the least harm to
human life, and prohibit designs that cause machines to consider
age, gender, and the physical constitution of humans in their
decision-making.108
The European Parliament’s approach is also instructive. It
promulgated recommendations on AI regulation requiring that
machines do no harm to humans and obey orders given by humans,
and proposed “four ethical principles in robotics engineering: 1)
beneficence (AI should act in the best interests of humans); 2) nonmaleficence (AI should not harm humans); 3) autonomy (human
interaction with AI should be voluntary); and 4) justice (the benefit
of AI should be distributed fairly).” 109
prosthesis).
106
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C. Proposal for The Future: The Asilomar AI Principles
Considering all of the above, U.S. lawmakers should consider a
comprehensive, centralized framework to encourage smooth and
cohesive integration of advanced AI and humans. To balance the
need for adequate regulation without stifling innovation, lawmakers
should codify overarching principles to guide machine design and
manufacturing processes. As those activities lead to new
developments, lawmakers could adopt industry and market-specific
legislation when certain machines in specific markets reach
threshold maturity levels and market pervasiveness, similar to the
introduction of AV laws. We also propose deploying this approach
from a centralized regulatory regime to avoid the administrative
burden and complexity of complying with multiple and differing
state legislation.
To guide machine design in a way that preserves humanity and
encourages equity, the Asilomar AI Principles (the “Principles”)
should be codified as the overarching guidance for AI design and to
inform specific regulation for particular products, when needed.
In 2017, the Future of Life Institute developed the Principles as
a part of the Beneficial AI Conference.110 The Institute proposed the
Principles to guide the development of machines in a way that would
guarantee broad social benefits, safety, and the satisfaction of ethical
concerns.111 The Principles represent the most complete set of AI
standards established to date, and each Principle represents a
standard accepted by ninety percent or more of the Beneficial AI
Conference attendees including high profile and leading AI thought
leaders, researchers, scientists, entrepreneurs, economists and
government representatives. 112
Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. RESOL. P8_TA 2015/2103 (INL) 0051 (2017),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0051+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
110
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According to the Future of Life Institute (2017), the Principles
have been signed by 1,273 AI/Robotics researchers and 2,541
others, including the late Stephen Hawking and business mogul Elon
Musk. 113 The Principles are divided into three parts: 1) research
issues; 2) ethics and values; and 3) longer-term issues.114
CONCLUSION
Recent developments in science and technology have put AI on
a trajectory to interact with humans in unprecedented ways. As
human-AI interaction intensifies, so will associated risks, many of
which pose threats to humanity. Under current law, liability
mechanisms to address and mitigate those threats are inadequate and
put the average consumer at a distinct disadvantage compared to the
companies in the best position to advance AI. A socio-legal
perspective is best suited to address that gap as it considers the
sociological aspects of how human activities are formed and
organized. In addition, law makers and society at large must strike a
balance between protecting society, protecting technological
progress and the economic benefits that could result. Codifying
underlying guidelines to influence the design of AI for the
betterment of society through the Asilomar Principles is a great
place to start.
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APPENDIX
The Twenty-three Asilomar Principles115
Research Issues:
1) Research Goal: The goal of AI research should be to create
not undirected intelligence, but beneficial intelligence.
2) Research Funding: Investments in AI should be
accompanied by funding for research on ensuring its beneficial use,
including thorny questions in computer science, economics, law,
ethics, and social studies.
3) Science-Policy Link: There should be constructive and
healthy exchange between AI researchers and policy-makers.
4) Research Culture: A culture of cooperation, trust, and
transparency should be fostered among researchers and developers
of AI.
5) Race Avoidance: Teams developing AI systems should
actively cooperate to avoid corner-cutting on safety standards.

Ethics and Values:
6) Safety: AI systems should be safe and secure throughout
their operational lifetime, and verifiably so where applicable and
feasible.
7) Failure Transparency: If an AI system causes harm, it should
be possible to ascertain why.
8) Judicial Transparency: Any involvement by an autonomous
system in judicial decision-making should provide a satisfactory
explanation auditable by a competent human authority.
115
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9) Responsibility: Designers and builders of advanced AI
systems are stakeholders in the moral implications of their use,
misuse, and actions, with a responsibility and opportunity to shape
those implications.
10)
Value Alignment: Highly autonomous AI systems
should be designed so that their goals and behaviors can be assured
to align with human values throughout their operation.
11)
Human Values: AI systems should be designed and
operated so as to be compatible with the ideals of human dignity,
rights, freedoms, and cultural diversity.
12) Personal Privacy: People should have the right to access,
manage and control the data they generate, given AI systems’ power
to analyze and utilize that data.
13) Liberty and Privacy: The application of AI to personal data
must not unreasonably curtail people’s real or perceived liberty.
14) Shared Benefit: AI technologies should benefit and
empower as many people as possible.
15) Shared Prosperity: The economic prosperity created by AI
should be shared broadly, to benefit all of humanity.
16) Human Control: Humans should choose how and whether to
delegate decisions to AI systems, to accomplish human-chosen
objectives.
17) Non-subversion: The power conferred by control of highly
advanced AI systems should respect and improve, rather than
subvert, the social and civic processes on which the health of society
depends.
18) AI Arms Race: An arms race in lethal autonomous weapons
should be avoided.
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Longer-term Issues:
19) Capability Caution: There being no consensus, we should
avoid strong assumptions regarding upper limits on future AI
capabilities.
20) Importance: Advanced AI could represent a profound
change in the history of life on earth, and should be planned for and
managed with commensurate care and resources.
21) Risks: Risks posed by AI systems, especially catastrophic or
existential risks, must be subject to planning and mitigation efforts
commensurate with their expected impact.
22) Recursive Self-Improvement: AI systems designed to
recursively self-improve or self-replicate in a manner that could lead
to rapidly increasing quality or quantity must be subject to strict
safety and control measures.
23) Common Good: Superintelligence should only be developed
in the service of widely shared ethical ideals, and for the benefit of
all humanity rather than one state or organization (Future of Life
Institute, 2017).

